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1. Introduction 
For several years, the United Nations has ranked Norway as having the highest standard of 
living in the world. This position is the result of a complex mix of ‘politics of solidarity’ 
(redistribution of resources), ‘professional administration’ (efficient, loyal and competent 
bureaucracy), and ‘good luck (oil resources since the 1970s). A comparatively large degree of 
economic equality, not least safeguarded through a compulsory and generous insurance 
system (the National Insurance Scheme), has contributed to giving Norway a reputation as 
the prototype of a successful Keynesian welfare state.  
There is hardly any disagreement about the characterisation of all the Scandinavian welfare 
states as success stories, at least if one agrees on the overarching aim of income equality and 
even distribution of wealth (Barth et al., 2003). However, the recipe for success in a period of 
relative scarcity is not necessarily the recipe for success in times of affluence. Or to be more 
specific: The recipe for success when people have a ‘lack of money’ is not necessarily the 
correct recipe if the pressing problem is ‘lack of meaning’. While the first type of problem 
can be attacked by stimulating economic growth, this is at best only partly true for the 
second type of problem. The research topic I want to bring into focus in this article is the 
(general) dilemma related to politicians using yesterday’s problems and especially, 
yesterday’s way of understanding these problems, to attack today’s problems. My frame of 
reference is the Norwegian welfare state. I ask to what extent the traditional welfare 
approach (as seen in all of the Scandinavian countries) is able to grasp the essence of 
modern social problems. Not disregarding the importance of safeguarding people’s 
economic basis, and not disregarding the strong efforts that have been taken to prevent 
social problems to arise, I want to argue that the ‘technocratic’ and ‘administrative-
managerial’ approach to welfare politics need to be supplemented with a more ‘sociological’ 
approach, where the challenge of ‘lack of meaning’ is given closer and more serious 
attention. Even though the awareness of such a perspective has been present – at least at the 
rhetorical level - since the 1970s, the significant operational implications of such recognition 
have been more difficult to identify. By raising the discussion on problem identification 
(‘what is the real problem?’) I do not want to challenge the celebration of the Scandinavian 
welfare state model as a project of success, but I ask what type of challenges we are 
confronted with if ideals about social inclusion, social solidarity, and the quest for living a 
respectful life, are given due attention. In this regard I am not talking about technical 
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questions related to indexing of pensions or actuarial accounting of insurances etc. I am 
talking about sociological challenges regarding belonging, respect and recognition in a 
society of atomisation and exclusion. My assertion is that even the celebrated Scandinavian 
welfare state is unable to handle these challenges satisfactorily. It is unable to fulfill its basic 
promise about protecting its weakest citizens, not primarily against material, but against 
existential distress1.         
The general perspective underlying my research question was clearly expressed by 
Galbraith back in 1958 when he made the important observation that ‘we are guided, in 
part, by ideas that are relevant to another world; and as a further result we do many things 
that are unnecessary; some that are unwise, and a few that are insane’2 (Galbraith, 1971: 32). 
He added that the ideas by which politicians have interpreted their existence and challenges 
were not forged in a world of wealth but in a world of poverty. By asking this type of 
question, Galbraith turns our attention to what should really be a focus of science: what 
really is the problem? In societies characterised by The Great Disruption  (Fukuyama, 2000) 
and Liquid Modernity (Bauman 2000), with an increasing number of people Seeking Safety in 
an Insecure World (Bauman, 2001), politicians and ministries are continuously searching for 
‘solutions’ to a broad variety of social problems; problems which actually call for a deeper 
reflection concerning what this problem really is about, and which, in turn, might call for 
qualitative new approaches regarding problem solving.        
Furthermore, having control of the national economy in a period of protectionism is 
something different from having control in a period of global market competition and a 
disempowered national state. If a fair income distribution (‘Robin Hood politics’) was a 
realistic aim in the days of Keynes (until the mid-1970s), the chances of ending up with 
increasing income differences (‘Matthew effect’) and processes of social exclusion are high in 
an era of neo-liberalistic economy. But most of all, there is a good chance that alienation, 
withdrawal and resignation will create a situation of deep mental distress among an 
increasing number of people. 
Inspired by the thoughts of Galbraith, I will first give a brief outline of the main social problems 
in Norway in different periods after WWII. Most attention will be given to the period 1945-
80 when the main standards and principles were set. I will look at how the dominating 
social problems were interpreted at that time (i. e. how did they answer to the ‘what-is-the-
problem’ question), which measures were implemented to combat the problems, and then I 
will ask to what extent these strategies could be described as adequate in preventing social 
problems occurring. In conclusion, my analysis is a story supporting Galbraith, not in the 
assertion that politicians have done ‘insane’ things, but in the observation that politicians 
                                                                 
1 Some have argued that the failure of the welfare state to prevent social problems was a main reason 
for the New Right turn from the early 1980s. As an illustration, Minister of Finance (1990-93) in New 
Zealand, Ruth Richardson (referred in Boston, 1999: 25) formulated this critique of the comprehensive 
welfare state: ‘It set out to reduce poverty and ended up increasing poverty. It set out to reduce income 
inequality and ended up increasing inequality. It set out to allow people to live in dignity, and ended 
up creating ghettos where lawlessness and hopelessness are rife. If that is success, its ways must be 
mysterious indeed’. 
2 Einstein (referred in DeHart Hurd, 1998) has formulated a corresponding insight when saying that, 
‘the significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we 
created them’. 
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have been ‘guided, in part, by ideas that are relevant to another world’. More specifically, I 
find that the strong emphasis on macro and structurally oriented measures after WWII (i.e. 
labour market politics, regional politics, trade and industry politics, in combination with an 
extensive ‘cradle to grave’ welfare policy) were successful regarding income compensation 
for most citizens. However, when it comes to tackling the welfare problems of late 
modernity (i. e. not the lack of money, but the lack of meaning) I find that even the 
successful Norwegian welfare state has been unable to compete. I will argue that there is a 
mismatch between some types of social problems (‘the lack of meaning’ problems) and the 
measures applied to combat them. In short, the way of thinking is characterised by (mainly) 
applying yesterday’s medicine to today’s problems – and these problems are in certain regards 
different from yesterdays’ problems. While safeguarding economic security still represents a 
basic mandate for the welfare state, I maintain that the dominating technocratic, 
professional, scientific, bureaucratic, and pecuniary approach to modern welfare problems 
is insufficient. For many years, Norwegian politicians have announced a strong belief in the 
contribution that social scientists, qua social engineers, in cooperation with an efficient 
administrative system, could deliver to create an inclusive society. Because of this strong 
optimism in scientific solutions to a variety of social problems, the politicians have avoided 
a more fundamental debate on social problems as value dilemmas. And even more: the 
ability to decode and interpret modern social problems in a language of value conflicts and 
value priorities seems to have been weakened as social scientists gradually entered the role as 
‘state consultants in preventive work’. While waiting for scientific solutions to significant 
social challenges, the politicians were ‘protected’ from being exposed to these problems as 
being deeply political.   
The perspective presented here implies a critique of overly optimistic politicians when it 
comes to their strong belief in ‘social engineering’ solutions to some of the main challenges 
in late modernity. For many years governments have been seeking support from the social 
scientests for help in much the same way as they sought support from the economists when 
the markets went into meltdown in the 1930s. At that time, the economic science actually 
succeeded in ‘rescuing’ the crisis ridden economies (with Keynesian medicine). Now it 
seems that politicians expect representatives of the (remaining) social sciences to solve 
today’s social problems by way of some sort of social engineering strategies. No doubt, these 
sciences should do their utmost to help curb emerging social problems. However, today a 
‘dangerous’ mix of interests has occurred between governments in search of legitimation 
and solutions, and a ‘social science industry’ (social researchers accompanied by a swelling 
profession of social workers) which (too) easily promises ‘technocratic’ solutions to what 
essentially is a political problem. In Norway, as in so many other countries, politicians are 
searching for what they call ‘evidence-based’ knowledge that can tell them in a scientific way 
and with scientific certainty, ‘what works’ in our endeavours to prevent crime, mental distress, 
suicide, drug addiction, etc. As problems escalate, so does the rhetoric about ‘prevention 
first’, and so do calls for scientific solutions. I do not want to discredit the social sciences and 
their capacity for supporting governments in their efforts to create social integrative 
societies. However, I do signal a need for critical reflection when it comes to differentiating 
between ‘value conflicts’ and ‘administrative problems’. Herbert Marcuse (1991) has 
formulated the problem very distinctly, when saying that ‘the historical achievement of 
science and technology has rendered possible the translation of values into technical tasks – the 
materialization of values. Consequently, what is at stake is the redefinition of values in 
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technical terms, as elements in technological process’ (Marcuse, 1991: 236, author’s italics). 
From a philosopher’s point of view, von Wright (1994) has made a corresponding remark, 
when warning against the illusion that more scientific techniques can protect us against 
threats in modern society.   
While the Norwegian welfare state probably deserves its good reputation when it comes to 
safeguarding basic economic necessities for its citizens, this should not prevent us from asking 
critical questions like those presented above. In this article I want to address the society of 
social sciences as well as the society of politicians and plea for drawing a clearer line of 
demarcation concerning ‘what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God’; i. e. what is for 
politicians to tackle as questions that belong to the sphere of values, and what is for social 
scientists to handle as a ‘professional’ topic. As an illustration of the implications of my way of 
arguing, I want fewer, not more social workers, psychologists, professional care takers, to 
occupy kindergartens, schools, etc., to ‘help’ our children. I want fewer, not more, advisors, 
counselors, coaches, to guide our coming generation into society. But I want more discussions 
about ethical implications of political priorities that most likely produce The Exclusive Society 
(Young, 1999). Today, I think too many social scientists are offering ‘tools’ that represent the 
‘wrong’ answer to the main challenges of today. Even though he puts the message sharply, 
Ivan Illich (1973) has a point when saying: ‘The pooling of stores of information, the building 
up of a knowledge stock, the attempt to overwhelm present problems by the production of 
more science is the ultimate attempt to solve a crisis by escalation’. Norway is a country that 
can afford to ‘professionalise’ (as Illich describes it) social challenges in late modern society. 
However, I am not sure if this represents a (socially) sustainable road to the future. 
2. The Norwegian welfare state 1945-2010: the success and the limits of state 
intervention 
2.1 1945-60: Work and welfare as synonymous concepts 
At the end of WWII, the answer to the question: ‘what is the problem’ was more or less self- 
evident and could be converted into one word: poverty. For the Labour Government (in 
office for some twenty years after 1945) the overarching challenge was to rebuild the 
country through optimal and responsible investments, and through safeguarding full 
employment. As Hanisch (1977: 58) expressed it, ‘work and welfare became two sides of the 
same political coin, which means that the economic policy was targeted towards preventing 
social problems through stabilising and increasing the level of employment’. With this point 
of departure, the logical implication was that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Labour became the two dominant institutions to ‘remove distress, insecurity and inequality’ 
(Labour Party, Policy Program, 1949: 2). For those citizens who, for different reasons, were 
unable to contribute through regular work (pensioners, disabled or sick people, the 
unemployed) all the political parties in Norway agreed on a plan to (hopefully) render 
superfluous the old ‘Poor Law’ (means tested payments) by incorporating different benefits 
into an integrated National Insurance Scheme (passed in 1966). Once again, the challenge 
confronting the politicians was how to safeguard an economic bottom line for every citizen.  
The important message is that there was absolutely no disagreement about concluding that 
there was a complete overlap of interests between the economic and the socio-cultural 
system: what was beneficial for Norway Inc. was beneficial for its citizens. The main 
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challenge was to speed up economic and human investments and in this way contribute to 
the indisputable aim of rapid economic growth. ‘The Construction State’ became almost 
synonymous to ‘The Welfare State’. Social prevention became synonymous to rebuilding 
and developing the country economically, and the sooner the better. In principle, all the 
main social problems that existed could be converted into a question of money to meet well-
known needs (and not as later on, a question of knowledge and expertise to meet complex 
human needs). 
2.2 1960-70: Integrating welfare into the process of economic growth 
This is a decade of optimism. However, already in this period the first signals of uneasiness 
concerning social development appear on the political agenda. In the long-range program 
1958-61 from the Labour Government one reads that there was a need to re-adjust social 
policy thinking: 
Economic progress and social reforms through many years have brought new types of social 
challenges to the forefront. The significant social problems are to an increasing extent about 
health problems in its broadest meaning (mental depression, lasting disability, chronic illnesses 
and alcohol abuse), about family and crime problems. Exclusively economic support will in these 
cases rarely represent a lasting solution (White Paper, no. 67, 1957: 72, author’s italics). 
 This was the argument behind the conclusion that a re-orientation of social policy strategies 
was desirable. The most important aspect of the proclaimed change could be described as a 
‘scientification’ and ‘professionalisation’ of social policy (‘a significant need for social research 
has appeared’, as expressed by the Ministry of Social Health and Welfare; op. cit.: 72). The 
most important aspect of this emphasis was recurring declarations about the importance of 
social preventive thinking; to which the social sciences most certainly could contribute.  
The feeling of ‘uneasiness’ referred to above was expressed by the Party Leader Trygve Bratteli 
(LP) at the National Congress (NC) in 1965. After a short presentation on the profound 
economic and technical changes that had taken place since 1945, Bratteli continued: 
Modern societies – to an increasing extent characterised by science and technical innovation – 
seem to have entered an essentially new type of development. What is happening is that some 
very profound changes take place at a very high speed. However, these rapid changes that take 
place in the everyday lives of ordinary people will lead to uneasiness and uncertainty, and it will 
lead to significant industrial and social problems’ (NC, 1965: 147).  
The speech ended, however, in an optimistic way: ‘The challenge confronting our Party is to 
take the lead in taking advantage of the enormous possibilities that modern times represent 
and to find a solution to social problems accompanying economic growth and change’ (op. 
cit.: 147).        
In the early 1960s leading politicians recognised that involving Norway in an increasingly 
competitive European free market system3 would speed up geographical, technological and 
                                                                 
3 After a relatively protectionist period, Norway gradually liberalised its trade relations after WWII. In 
1960, the country joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which meant a gradual 
deconstruction of customs and tariff barriers. The immediate result was a speeding up of geographical 
and social changes.  
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economic changes that very likely would generate social problems. While these social 
problems were only vaguely identified by the politicians (e. g. the talk about ‘uneasiness’), 
public documents show that ‘mental problems’ (mental distress, drug and alcohol abuse, 
family problems, crime) rather than ‘pecuniary problems’ (poverty) were coming to the 
forefront of the political agenda. How should these ‘new’ challenges be confronted? 
At the rhetorical level the Labour Party responded by including ‘contentment’ into the 
established general aim about ‘economic growth’, and, in addition, announced as an 
overarching aim that the government wanted to create ‘safety during social change’. 
Furthermore, an appeal to the social sciences entered the political programs. Since the 
economists had been very successful in saving a wrecked economy in the 1930s (Keynes), it 
was now reasonable to ask the social scientists for help with new types of problems 
appearing in the socio-cultural system. Once again, Trygve Bratteli presented the 
authoritative message: 
During a period of huge changes and reform of our society we have to give priority to the science 
about man and his environment, about the body and the health of our soul, about contact and 
living together, about human society and about human history. In every regard we have to invite 
the help that science to an increasing extent can supply us with’ (NC, 1965: 149).   
This declaration was mirrored in the Working Plan for the Labour Party from the same year: 
The expertise among researchers and the impatient struggle among ordinary people for a better 
society represent dynamic forces that can develop our new society in a way that induces safety 
and security in a world of changes’ (op. cit.: 149).   
In other words; science (together with ordinary people’s struggle) was seen as a kind of 
guarantor of the social well-being of its citizens. While the politicians in 1945 appealed to 
what they defined as ‘all constructive forces’ to participate in rebuilding the country, twenty 
years later this appeal explicitly included the social sciences. From the historical documents 
it is evident that the political interpretation of the existing social problems was that well 
informed administrative measures at different levels could curb eventual ‘barbaric’ side 
effects in the wake of a ‘civilising’ economic growth. Social problems could, as in the first 
decade after 1945, be converted into administrative problems of regulation, and 
consequently, they did not directly provoke political questions regarding value priorities 
etc. The confidence in the problem solving capability of the social sciences was not only 
unquestioned, it was taken for granted. In the political debates from this period politicians 
were talking about how the social sciences could help find solutions to the different types of 
social problems, not if they could. 
At the ‘operational’ level (i. e. practical politics) the Labour Government introduced through 
the 50s and 60s a wide variety of regulation instruments. In this way the classical social 
democratic ideology was visualised: instead of taking direct control over the means of 
production, one took a more indirect control via economic, financial, labour market, and 
regional politics. The basic way of thinking was expressed in the Principal Program from 
1967 (when the Labour Party was not in office). After having referred to the massive 
technical and economic changes that had taken place, the program declared that this 
development called for ‘bold efforts’ from the government. Since the country was only at the 
beginning of a process of change, a process that would set thousands of jobs at risk, it was 
steadily underlined that the government had to guarantee that every citizen was taken care 
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of and that any kind of passive resignation to the market forces was out of the question. In a 
political manifesto produced in 1967 this message was emphasized with these words: ‘What 
the country needs is firm control’ (NC, 1967: 227).           
This is not the place to go into details about which policy instruments Norwegian 
governments implemented in this period. What is well documented is that Norway figures 
as one of the most consistent social democratic governments in the world through at least 
three decades after 1945, with a strong focus on protecting every citizen from the negative 
side effects of economic turbulence. While it was explicitly recognised that taking advantage 
of global market involvement would have its price (from protectionism to free market 
competition), it was also declared that these changes would take place within full 
governmental control. Due to a well equipped tool box in the governmental offices, no one 
should fear for their overall living conditions: ‘We must be able to guarantee that the 
extensive structural changes taking place in economic life shall not hit anybody’, Per Kleppe 
(Minister of three different Ministries 1971-81) announced in his speech to the National 
Congress in 1969. 
 Summing up, we have seen that what was described as ‘new social problems’ (i. e. 
problems that could not be converted into problems of poverty) appeared on the agenda in 
the period 1960-70.  In retrospective, the government did not interpret these problems in a 
principally different way from how they interpreted social problems in the earlier period. 
Social uprooting and uneasiness did not really challenge the value priorities the government 
had made in the direction of turning the Norwegian economy into an open market 
economy. The hypothetical problems that were discussed as a (possible) consequence of a 
tougher economic climate were more or less passed over by reassurances saying that the 
omnipotent and interventionist state could act in a proactive and preventive way. What was 
the result? 
Given the strong measures that the government introduces in this period, the following 
quote from the Labour Party’s Principal Program (passed in 1969) appears surprising: 
Even in societies that have reached the highest material and technical level of standard one can 
register discontent, human callousness, conflicts and dissatisfaction. The industrial society has 
not succeeded in developing human ways of being together that satisfies basic social and 
psychological needs. We experience that people are alienated and that the competitive society and 
the one-dimensional cultivation of material goods generate a barren and empty life for many 
people’ (‘Labour Party’, 1969). 
To the extent that this description gives a fair portrait of the situation, the political ambition 
‘Economic growth and contentment’ from the early 1960s seems to have been partly achieved. 
While the political obligation to focus social prevention was formulated as early as in 1953, 
and the long term program from 1957 promised to ‘pay close attention to preventive health 
and social work’ (White Paper, no. 67, 1957: 72), towards the end of this decade different 
sources of information indicated that something had gone wrong. Also, this is the period 
when (in Norway) the relatively newly established science called ‘sociology’ started to 
report on ‘the social state of the country’. Book titles like The Myth of the Welfare State 
(Norway) and The Hollow Welfare State (Sweden), illustrates what should become even more 
apparent in the next decade. The optimism as for what could be obtained by way of an 
interventionist state seemed to have been exaggerated. It was not uncommon in the political 
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debate to hear that a concept like ‘the welfare society’ had to be put in inverted commas 
until the negative trends had been turned. The sudden increase in expenditures to social 
security benefits (the old means-tested ‘poor law’) represented only one worrying signal 
that ‘something was wrong’. Increasing crime figures was another. Even though the Labour 
Party had been out of office in the period 1965-70 it was admitted that the power balance 
between ‘market forces’ and ‘political control’ had developed in disfavor of the latter:  
‘To a large extent we are still hampered by insufficient tools for political control. We have too 
little knowledge about the society we want to change and the world we are a part of. We have to 
obtain more knowledge, more statistics, more research documentation in all fields of importance 
for the change of society’ (Per Kleppe, NC, 1969). 
A recurrent topic in the above presentation was the need for more and stronger measures to 
get political control over societal developments. In accordance with classical social 
democratic ideology, Per Kleppe was true to the voluntaristic perspective on politics, 
namely that, in principle, anything can be attained in terms of political goals as long as one 
occupies political power. Within a social democratic context, ‘governing’ is synonymous to 
‘ruling’. The technocratic elements in this ideology were easily identifiable in these years. 
When negative traits of development occurred it was only a question of time before 
ingenious planning tools could be invented (be it within the economic, the labour or the 
welfare policy). Especially, the belief that science could contribute to solve political 
challenges was strong. Gradually the planning tools were developed more in relation to the 
economic system (industrial, financial, regional, labour) than to the socio-cultural system 
(the National Insurance System was carried through in 1967). 
Let me return to the announcement made by Trygve Bratteli in 1965, when he said that the 
challenge for the next few years was ‘taking advantage of the enormous possibilities that 
modern times represent and to find a solution to social problems accompanying economic 
growth and change’. At the end of the decade it was openly admitted, even among Labour 
Party representatives, that this ‘solution’ was not yet found. As shown in Leonardsen (1993) 
this was not only due to a ‘lag’ in the preventive measures in relation to problem producing 
mechanisms, but also to a gradual policy change over some decades, expressed by 
Halvorsen (1977: 76) in this way: ‘While the safeguarding of full employment in the 1930s 
was considered as a part of the general welfare policy, these two fields were split after the 
War. The National Benefits System and the Social Security System were developed to take 
care of those who could not stick to or take a job’. How did these changes, away from a 
comprehensive perspective on welfare, affect the ambitious aims for welfare policy in the 
next decade? 
2.3 1970-80: ‘A qualitatively better society’? 
While the two preceding decades (in spite of some emanating social problems) had been 
characterised by broad optimism, the situation changed in this period. After almost thirty 
years of steady economic growth the international economy lost drive. Even before the oil 
crisis in 1973, a process of (relative) stagnation had started: a process that announced 
essential political readjustments. Traditional Keynesian demand side economics did not 
work in a globalised market economy and the new political signals were tellingly open: ‘It is 
already evident that, on longer terms, it would not have been possible to increase the 
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activities and the income redistribution to the extent that is included in the present 
arrangements and plans’ (White Paper no. 71, 1972-73, Special Analysis no. 2). These were 
the days, in Norway as well as outside the country, when expansive governmental policies 
were replaced by careful contractions, mirrored in book titles like The Fiscal Crisis of the State 
(1973), Can Government Go Bankrupt (1978), and Legitimation Crisis (Habermas, 1976).  
The dilemma confronting politicians in Norway could be described in this way: on one side, 
social scientists reported that social problems were on an even steeper increase than in the 
preceding decade (at this time, the concept of ‘the client producing system’ was often used 
in reports, Kolberg, 1970: 140 ). One of the more profiled voices among sociological 
researchers made his point clear by saying that; 
until now, the social policy has to a large extent safeguarded the life quality of ordinary people 
and those with disabilities and made them secure and safe if something negative was to happen. 
In this way, social policy is an expression of the power balance in society – the welfare benefits 
are used by the strong ones when they need it. Even if the intention with social policy is to help 
the weakest among us, there is a lot to be improved in the coming years (Løchen, 1970: 208).     
This critical perspective on the situation in the early 1970s was actually echoed by one of the 
dominant voices in the Labour Party itself, Per Kleppe: 
I will go as far as to say that I do not think we are able to carry out our aims as for our welfare 
policy in a society that is so strongly dominated by capitalist influence as Norway is today. The 
implementation of our welfare program takes as a premise quite a radical change of society. We 
are not running for “adaptation policy” (LP’s Conference on welfare politics, 1971: 81-82).   
While sociologists (and politicians themselves) reported negative trends concerning social 
problems and the economists reported that ‘throwing money at social problems’ was a non-
sustainable alternative, the situation became even worse for the politicians, when the 
electorate started reacting against what was labeled ‘kind-ism’ (i. e. too much social support 
paid to all sorts of ‘needy’ people). In 1973, a populist tax-paying-refusers’ party was 
established in Norway (‘The Anders Lange’s Party for a significant reduction of taxes and 
customs’) with some 5% support among the electorate. For the politicians in charge, this 
looked like a ‘catch 22’ situation. Dahl Jacobsen (1971: 39) presented the problem in this 
way:  
A joint problem for all the Scandinavian countries is that the very fundament for the welfare 
policy until today is about disintegrating. The debate on welfare policy has gotten a taint of 
breaking up atmosphere, and it is absolutely not evident in which direction we are to move from 
here.  
Most of the political parties took responsibility for these changed attitudes by inviting a 
broad debate about the future of the welfare state, and in 1971 the Labour Party launched 
their strategy under the headline: ‘A new perspective on the welfare policy’. Minister of 
Social Welfare, Odd Højdahl presented the outline of this strategy by first openly admitting 
that, for the politicians, it had come as a big surprise that social problems escalated at the 
same time as economic affluence and social reforms had been attained. ‘[We] thought that 
the abolishing of mass poverty, improved housing, and better educational and working 
conditions, would make main elements of the welfare policy superfluous. However, it was 
not that simple’. This ‘welfare paradox’ (less poverty, more social problems) was hard to 
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understand for those politicians who had their historical background in the 1930s (crisis 
ridden economy with high unemployment) and the 1940s (war economy).  
However, when it came to the content of the new signals regarding welfare policy, the 
perspective was much the same as in earlier days. While Højdahl admitted that ‘the strong 
demands for efficiency and productivity in different sectors of society make many people 
fall by the wayside’, he concluded his presentation by saying that, ’the only solution is 
further economic growth. I will ask you not to equal economic growth with social problems’ 
(NC, 1971: 254-255). He explicitly announced that what was good for the economy was good 
for people in general. In short, the way of understanding the social problems of the 1970s 
was much the same as it was in 1945: it was through rapid economic growth in combination 
with a broad variety of governmental measures through which the welfare society could be 
sustained. 
For sure, the measures that were introduced to prevent social problems were many and 
strong also in this period. What had been implemented in the 1960s as a vigorous regional 
policy, industrial policy, financial policy, labour policy, and an extensive welfare policy, was 
prolonged in this decade. Especially important was the introduction of the ‘Establishing 
Control Law’, 1977, and the support system for industrial activity called ‘Geographical 
differentiation of the payroll tax’. However, the general economic development in Europe 
and elsewhere led to a change (from around 1977) in the direction of more micro oriented 
and selective measures. Through different sets of ’micro stimulations’ the government 
hoped to avoid an economic setback as could be seen in the rest of Europe. But as the 
economic setback lingered on, the government was ‘forced’ to resign over its attempts to 
cause the intermediary deletion of the market mechanism (direct support to factories etc.). 
Towards the end of the decade the message was a call for giving priority to those businesses 
and factories that had the ability to restructure and modernise. The Robin Hood principle 
had to resign for the Matthew principle. As Østerud (1978: ii) observed, there was a striking 
tendency to ’lower the level of ambitions, and to adapt to the external leads and changes, 
and to regard public plans as a foundation of information in the continuous process of 
decision’ (in bold in the text). This implied, according to Østerud, a completely new role for 
planning and planners. The fact that Norway gradually became more involved in an open, 
competitive European market economy4, and also, that Norway since 1970 became an oil 
nation, clearly amplified this development. A process of abdication from political control of 
the economy became increasingly dominant at a time when the impetus for change 
escalated.  
One should note that in spite of economic conditions that indicated increasing turbulence, 
and in spite of negative reports regarding increasing social problems, the level of political 
ambitions was unchanged. Taking care of ‘soft values’ was as important as before. Within 
the frames of what was called ‘a new welfare policy’ the Labour Party continuously talked 
about ‘giving social values preeminence’ in every regard and it was imperative that ‘social 
policy’ (which in Norway is written in one word, indicating a type of sector politics) from 
                                                                 
4 After having become a member of the EFTA, the government tried to become a member of the EU. 
However, this attempt was turned down twice (1972 and 1994) by the electorate. However, in 1994 
Norway became a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). EEA is based on the same four 
‘freedoms’ as the EU (the free movement of goods, person, services and capital among the EEA member 
countries). 
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now on should be written in two words (indicating that social values should be a premise for 
all types of planning). A stronger focus was directed at developing what was called ‘self-
supporting networks’; not least because one had gradually reached an awareness that ‘the 
state cannot make people happy’5. All these declarations were formulated at the same time 
as the ‘winds of change’ were accelerating. What Vice-President Reiuf Steen at the National 
Congress described in 1973 as the (existing) ‘panting competition society’ (NC, 1973: 62) 
should be transformed in the direction of ‘a real equal society where people had a chance of 
experiencing peace and prospects for developing all their abilities’ (op. cit.: 62). However, 
such an ambitious aim could be attained only if stronger measures were introduced. The 
message from Steen was crisp and clear: 
‘For the Labour Party there should be absolutely no doubt concerning the main perspective: by 
intervening directly into the societal system, by removing the causes of the problems, through 
the regional policy, through measures like rehabilitation allowance and rehabilitation 
employment, we will reach a society with people that function in accordance to their talents 
rather than investing a lot of money to repair damages evolving due to cold and inhuman 
conditions of competition in the labour market and in society in general’ (underlining in text, 
NC, 1973: 66).  
We can conclude that the government continued having high ambitions for building ‘a 
qualitatively better society’. The overarching strategy for the governing Labour Party was 
condensed in the slogan ‘Economic growth and protection’ (i. e. of people and nature). This 
was the declared road to ‘a qualitatively better society’.  In addition, a continuous flow of 
new administrative tools for keeping structural changes under control were implemented in 
the 1970s. But perhaps most importantly, the trust in the social sciences for supporting the 
politicians with the necessary know-how to manoeuver in a complex and mobile society was 
uncontested. Facing the question of how much change society could take, the Minister of 
Education and Research Einar Førde declared in 1980: ‘One of the most important tools for 
political governing that should be implemented is an action program for social research’ 
(Førde, 1980: interview). In other words, the technocratic paradigm taking for granted that 
‘science’ would come up with continuously new approaches that would counteract negative 
side effects of rapid change, was still the dominating way of thinking.  
However, the initiatives in the direction of increasing the politicians control of society, took 
place at the same time as steps were taken to speed up economic changes in society. 
Increased integration in European and global markets alongside a developing oil-based 
economy (i. e. two strong impulses of change) were the backdrop to an expansion of 
governmental steering instruments. To use an illustrative picture, one pushed harder on the 
accelerator but as a compensation one also pushed harder on the brakes. Bratteli gave a 
precise presentation of the situation in 1973 when saying: ‘I think most people think the 
speed of change in society is quite good. What we need now is safety and security during 
the accompanying changes’ (NC, 1973: 29). The question is: would it be the political slogan 
‘safety and security during change’ that would be the most likely outcome in the coming 
years or would it rather be ‘a change of safety and security’ for the citizens?  
                                                                 
5 This perspective was presented by Gro Harlem Brundtland (Minister of the Environment) at the 
National Congress in 1979, when she declared that ‘it is a main challenge to follow a strategy where 
people are empowered to handle their problems themselves’ (NC, 1979: 134). 
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2.4 1980-2010: From Keynes to Adam Smith. Paradise lost?       
In 1983, Kolberg published a book (about Norway) entitled The welfare state – goodbye? Five 
years later, Marklund (Sweden) published Paradise lost? The Nordic welfare states and the 
recession 1975-1985. Both titles indicate the main focus of the welfare state debate, actually all 
through the period 1980-2010. These were the years of a general right wing turn in politics. 
Even though (as we have seen) the economic contraction started in the mid-1970s, in all 
Nordic countries it took until the early 1980s before governments implemented the first 
more systematic restrictions in welfare spending (Marklund, 1988: 30). Norway, in these 
years economically strengthened through its new status as an oil nation, representing no 
exception to this general trend of welfare contraction. An important political change 
characterising this period was that the Labour Party lost some of its hegemonic status. 
During the period 1981-86/1989-90, and 1997-2000/2001-2005 Norway had 
conservative/centre-right governments, to some extent inspired by neo-liberal thinking. 
While the Norwegian Labour Party held a rhetorical distance to this ideology, like its sister 
parties in Europe, the neo-liberal influence was easily identifiable also within the social 
democratic camp. However, in the midst of a new recognition that one had to define limits 
for public expenditures, these problems (as they were experienced by the politicians) did not 
actually seem to decrease6.             
But which type of social problems were registered during the period 1980-2010? To what 
extent did the extensive preventive interventions announced in the preceding periods 
(regional policy, labour market policy, structural policy, and the general extensive welfare 
policy) result in a decrease of social problems? At the entrance of the 1980s the strong efforts 
in preventing social problems seemed to have had a rather disappointing effect: 
The strong economic growth has had its price…. The rapid changes have created uneasiness, 
alienation and insecurity about the future. New human problems have appeared: new illnesses 
and new troubles. Drug abuse increases. … Beneath the surface of wealth we can find huge 
human and social problems that are unsolvable within the present system of dominating 
capitalistic features (Labour Party, 1981). 
The Party Leader, Reiulf Steen, was very explicit when, in 1981, he declared that ‘not at any 
time since WWII has social security been more vulnerable than now’. Vice President Einar 
Førde expressed his worries in 1983 by saying that ’we can fill up a medium big Norwegian 
city with children suffering from what is known as ”serious lack of care”; adding that the 
youngsters optimism for the future had changed in the direction of pessimism and fear. 
According to Førde, the ‘No-Future Generation’ had arrived. In the Labour Party’s program 
1986-89, the challenge was identified in this way: ‘A big and increasing number of children 
and youngsters are being neglected, maltreated, they drop out of school and end up 
drifting’. Also, it was stated that ‘queues for getting financial assistance are increasing’ 
(primarily due to increasing unemployment rates and increasing housing costs) (Election 
Manifesto, 1986-89). In the 1990s, the worrying signals referred to ’too many children getting 
too little care and supervision’, and cases of incest, child maltreatment and children living 
on the street represented illustrations of this (Election Manifesto, 1990-93). In a statement 
                                                                 
6 An overview of references regarding official publications (1980-2010), covering topics on social 
prevention and social welfare, amounts to at least 60 references. Like in the preceding periods, I delimit 
myself to references referring to the Labour Party. 
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passed at the National Congress in 1992, the Labour Party declared that ‘loneliness, fear, 
increase in psychiatric sufferings, increase in suicides, even among children and young 
people, indicate that time and efforts do not suffice for giving the necessary care we should 
offer each other’. An increase in crime (especially serious crimes) was part of the picture. 
Four years later, the ‘Principles and values program’ talked about problems like lack of 
social network in society, little reciprocity and contact among people, increasing crime, drug 
abuse, and mental illness. Suicide was reported to be one of the most frequent reasons for 
death among young people, mirroring increasing loneliness and social isolation among 
people (‘Principels and values’, 1996). At the Labour Party National Congress in 1996 the 
Party Leader Torbjørn Jagland announced that ‘a new under-class’ and ‘new class divisions’ 
were emanating. At the turn of the century, poverty and the abolishment of poverty had 
become an essential problem to combat. At the Congress in 2000, Jagland reported that some 
70,000 children were living below the poverty level (Election Manifesto, 2001-05), ‘many 
children are not in a position to have their dinner every day; they never go for a holiday; they 
cannot participate in school excursions’. Problems regarding eating disturbances also occurred 
at this time. Two years on, Jagland admitted that ‘the stress, the pressure, and the competition 
drive for more and more material goods had made a significant number of groups burned out 
and expelled from the labour market’ (NC, 2002: 18). Finally, at the National Congress in 2005 
and 2007 Prime Minster and Party Leader Jens Stoltenberg had to admit that, in spite of strong 
governmental efforts, social and economic inequalities and injustice had taken a hold in 
Norwegian society7. The increasing amount of immigrants was only one of the reasons that 
one could register an expansion of the ‘new under-class’. While people continuously had 
become materially richer they were not necessarily living a richer life, he stated.  
One should remember that it was a conservative government that was in office during most 
of the 1980s, implementing policies of a more neo-liberal character than the Labour Party 
wanted. Accordingly, Labour Party representatives were strong in their critique of those 
voices preaching a language of free competition and celebration of narrow-minded 
capitalistic efficiency. These groups (i.e. the conservative government) were actually 
presenting ‘an uninhibited appeal to human egoism’ (Gunnar Berge, NC, 1985: 68) while, on 
the other side, the Labour Party would recommend stronger efforts from ‘society’. However, 
when analysing why inequalities and injustice had increased ‘in spite of decades of intense 
endeavors to safeguard that every citizen had equal opportunities’, Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg (Labour Party) admitted that it was not only the centre-right government that 
was to blame. Increasing inequalities were due also to ‘strong forces in the societal 
development that continuously pull in the direction of inequality. Thus, inequality is 
reproduced from generation to generation’ (NC, 2005: 16). Stoltenberg did not at this 
occasion specify what he meant by ‘strong forces’, but if we look at earlier presentations by 
leading Labour Party representatives, one will find this: The Labour Prime Minister Odvar 
Nordli declared in 1979 that they (i. e. the Labour Party) for too long had disregarded that 
the international system needed leadership through a binding international cooperation, 
and that they ‘for too long had failed to take the consequences of the fact that this system 
was without real control by national and international organisations’ (NC, 1979: 62). Even 
                                                                 
7 According to a OECD report from 2008, ‘income inequality increased significantly in the early 2000s in 
Canada, Germany, Norway and the United States’ (OECD, 2008). For further documentation, see Wahl, 
2009. 
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though this was not equal to saying that the Norwegian economy was ‘drifting weak-willed 
on a rough ocean’ (expression used by Nordli), it meant that some basic prerequisites for the 
national economy were set in this open international system. Reiulf Steen (Party Leader) 
shared this analysis when (two years later) he said that ‘as a political party and as a political 
movement, we have not to a sufficient extent been in control of the new societal conditions 
we ourselves have been the driving forces behind’ (NC, 1981: 85).  
In short; as the Norwegian economy gradually had become more and more deeply involved 
in the European free market system, leading representatives of the Labour Party admitted 
that essential dimensions of the societal development were outside political control. But 
what could be done? No doubt, an essential ideological shift took place within the Labour 
Party during the 1980s; i. e. the period when a conservative government implemented what 
roughly could be defined as a neo-liberal inspired program (privatisation, marketisation, 
‘modernising’ the state administration, etc). The way leading representatives of the Labour 
Party interpreted the electorate in the 1980s, it was evident that the old rhetoric about 
governmental and bureaucratic solutions, heavily dependent on taxing and centralised 
solutions, had come into miscredit. 
The ideological shift that had already started in the 1970s was amplified during this period. 
The Labour Party, originally heavily anchored in a Keynesian tradition with a strong belief 
in the omnipotence of the central state, gradually had to recognise that an increasing 
integration in the European free market economy came at the price of shrinking national 
political control. For the Labour Party, political as well as economic arguments favored 
participation in an open market economy. However, this called for sobriety regarding which 
instruments were available in the political tool box.  
The main arena for declaring this ideological shift was the National Congress in 1987. Two 
speakers, Prime Minister/Party Leader Gro Harlem Brundtland and Vice President Einar 
Førde presented the ‘new’ message. As Norway had become more integrated into the 
European as well as the global economy, one had to acknowledge that ‘the task for political 
organisations should be the setting of political aims and defining the framework. After that, 
it is the leaders’ and their employees’ challenge to reach the given aims. We believe this will 
redeem innovation and engagement’ (Brundtland, NC, 1987: 21). Due to stronger demands 
among the electorate for more individualised and tailor-made services, one had to become 
more sensitive to such demands. The main challenge was to see that the services were 
offered on equal terms. It was argued that monopolies (public or private) more often 
developed in the direction of organisational coagulation than competing institutions. 
Accordingly, it would be a good strategy to bring competition into the public sector. From 
mixed economy to mixed administration – this was the message, and it was underlined that 
the trade-off between public and private sector was not to be defined once and for all.    
The political ambitions were no less than before. Taking care of the weakest in society, a 
universal welfare state, giving priority to the common interest, prevention instead of 
repairing; all the political aims from earlier periods were intact. The Prime Minister 
ascertained that it was people, not money, it was children, not cars, that should be in focus. 
However, new times demanded new strategies. In his introduction to the Labour Party’s 
election manifesto, Førde asked for a willingness to being self-critical about a socialist 
tradition where bureaucratisation and centralising tendencies had been strong. Referring to 
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the new manifest, he stated that the choice between public and private operation had to be 
done according to what was most convenient for reaching the given aim. It was the need of 
the customer that should be the defining standard. And people had to show more 
responsibility themselves. However, one precaution was taken: ’We shall offer no 
compromises when it comes to stating that health, social security and education are so basic 
common needs that we will not allow commersialisation of these services. In this connection 
I will recommend dogmatism’, Førde concluded (NC, 1987: 73). When the political program 
for the decade 2010-2020 (‘Social Democracy 2020: A New Party Program’) was launched, 
the traditional social democratic value foundation was confirmed by Vice President Helga 
Pedersen, who ‘re-named’ the Labour Party to ‘The Social Security Party’. The essence of 
this program, according to Pedersen, was social security for every citizen, for their jobs, 
education, and their welfare. And, like before, a significant strategy for safeguarding these 
aims was ‘a significant strengthening of the preventive efforts’ (NC, 2009: 78).     
Summing up the period 1980-2010; as a result of fundamental political and economic changes, 
the Labour Party ‘modernised’ much of its strategic thinking in this period. While the defense 
of the Scandinavian welfare state stood firm, a ’realistic’ approach to what this meant in an era 
of fierce competition and demands for efficiency was adopted. Like in China, the pragmatic 
approach saying that ‘it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches 
mice’, became a central mark of recognition for the Labour Party. ‘New politics for new times’; 
this was the recurring slogan, while simultaneously taking care of the old ideals.  
3. Look to Norway? Limits to social engineering policy and limits to social 
science solutions 
I want to use this historical overview, on a principal level, to discuss what kind of lessons can 
be drawn from the paradox that a strong, distributive welfare state (but less so during the last 
decade) in a very rich country like Norway has had to see social problems escalate (according 
to the politicians themselves) as material affluence increases? Why has social exclusion, crime, 
drug addiction, mental distress, and even expenditures on municipal financial assistance, been 
on an upward trend in spite of a strong political will for preventive politics, a broad (but 
decreasing) array of regulating measures, and a solid economy? If any country in the world 
should be able to compete with processes of alienation and anomie in late modernity, it should 
be Norway and the Nordic countries. As we have seen, the politicians themselves as well as 
governmental papers, appear to be quite disillusioned. Why look to Norway? I will trace this 
question in deep respect and recognition of what has been attained by the Nordic welfare 
states8. In a comparative perspective, there is obviously more on the credit than on the debit 
side of the account. However, the pronounced technocratic approach in the confrontation with 
‘modern’ social problems (defined as ‘problems of meaning’) call for critical comments. 
Furthermore, the obvious success story should not prevent us from asking searching questions 
about the role of, and the use of, the social sciences in political-administrative planning9.   
                                                                 
8 In addition to a general high living standard and economic equality, the Nordic countries are 
characterised by high levels of trust (Uslaner, 2007).   
9 My approach in this analysis is in many ways complementary to what Asdal (2011) has done concerning 
environmental policy in Norway. In her detailed analysis, Asdal shows how the rhetoric about nature and 
environmental questions clearly announced that these topics should have pre-eminence. When it came to 
environmental questions, one had to take ‘the asthmatics of nature’ as the staring point.   
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As we have seen, during some 25 years after WWII one could argue that ‘social problems’ 
was another term for ‘poverty’, and, accordingly, these problems could be converted to a 
pecuniary dimension. Preventive politics was synonymous with politics for economic 
growth. The period of welfare optimism; i. e. the period of uncontested belief that political-
administrative instruments would be able to prevent social problems, lasted as long as the 
Keynesian fundament for economic policy held firm. When the international scene changed 
and a neo-liberal ideology took control, this perspective gradually changed. Even though 
the ideology from the ‘old’ welfare state remained intact (taking care of people from cradle 
to grave), ideas about ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘self-supporting networks’ were 
announced. However, while the social problems appearing from the 1970s could be 
described as being of a complex and existential character (‘problems of meaning’), the 
interpretation of how these problems could be tackled or even prevented did not change in 
a way that affected the overarching priorities for general societal development. Generally 
speaking, the situation is not very different today. The confidence that, somewhere out 
there, there has to be some kind of sociological correspondence to Keynes that can be 
implemented seems to stand firm. Is there an alternative perspective? 
George and Wilding (1976) might represent an interesting starting point. When giving a 
kind of ideal type description of the modern economic system, they observe that if this 
system is to flourish, it both requires and generates a particular value system. According to 
these authors, the capitalistic system depends on and fosters an ethic of self-help, freedom, 
individualism, competition and achievement. They confront these values with the values 
needed to underpin a successful public welfare system, and continue: 
If such a system is to flourish, the stress on the virtue of self-help must be replaced by stress on 
the need to help others. Individualism must be replaced by a concern for the community at large; 
competition by co-operation; achievement must be defined in social and communal rather than in 
individual terms – values that are socialist rather than liberal’ (p. 118).  
In concluding, these authors bring to the forefront the deep value conflict that actually exists 
between the economic and the socio-cultural system; a conflict that is essential to 
understand ‘why fundamental aims set out in a period of post-war collectivist euphoria 
have not been achieved’ (p. 118).  
I will argue that a message pointing to a rationality conflict between the economic and the 
socio-cultural system is really what the science of sociology has been pleading for, from 
Durkheim to Bauman, from Polanyi to Sennett. A flourishing economy in a market society 
demands efficiency, competitiveness, flexibility, and an ideology of individualism and 
survival-of-the-fittest thinking. Contrary to this, a flourishing socio-cultural system calls for 
time, cooperation, routines, and an ideology of collectivism and ‘caring-for others’ 
(Leonardsen, 1993, Leonardsen forthcoming). While participation in the economic system 
demands certification (education), participation in the socio-cultural system is open. While 
being independent of others is important in a competing system, being dependent on others is 
what characterises life in the socio-cultural system at different times of the life span 
(children, pensioners, unemployed, handicapped etc.).   
The challenging question is whether this means that we are confronted with an antagonistic 
value conflict (as seems to be the position of George and Wilding) or not. Is the relationship 
between the economic and the socio-cultural system primarily a zero-sum type of 
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relationship (what one gains, the other loses), or is it realistically imaginable that a state of 
entente cordial can be arrived at (i. e. a situation of more even ‘power balance’ between 
conflicting values)? Asked sociologically; what does it take to bring the socio-cultural 
system into a more harmonious relationship with the economy than politicians and social 
scientists seem to think it is today (as shown above)?   
The basic philosophy behind the social democratic project has been the so-called ‘welfare 
principle’ (Tawney, Crosland). According to this principle, all kind of problems can be 
explained away in the sphere of distribution. For governments disposing a sensitive 
stethoscope and a multitude of governing instruments (including an army of knowledgeable 
researchers), there are principally no limits to what can be brought under political control. 
Governing is synonymous to ruling. The question is: Are the variety of modern social 
problems (here defined as ‘lack of meaning’ problems) of such a character that they can be 
converted to the formula of being ‘governable’ problems? Can these problems in a 
satisfactory way be handled in the sphere of distribution? ‘The welfare principle’ takes as a 
given premise that mostly all problems can be converted into this type of problem. My 
critique address two types of challenges in this connection: 
1. Antagonistic value conflicts. I do not want to simplify a very complex field of research by 
arguing that all the modern welfare problems should be regarded as the fruit of a 
merciless capitalistic system. They should not. No doubt, the welfare state has 
contributed to the mutation and modification of many value conflicts in these societies. 
As Esping-Andersen (1990) has pointed out, the welfare state has contributed to a de-
commodification of labour (i.e. public services are rendered as a matter of right, meaning 
that people can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market). Nevertheless, to the 
extent that the quality of a good society is demonstrated by the way it treats its poor and 
depressed, one has to admit that, even within the Nordic welfare state model, the 
inclusive society, where ‘people had a chance of experiencing peace and prospects for 
developing all their abilities’ (Steen 1973: 12) is at a significant distance. What’s more; this 
aim is a moving target which, even according to the politicians, seems to be extremely 
hard to attain. In the renowned book The Strategy of Equality, LeGrande (1982) has a 
chapter titled ‘The Dreamers’. In this chapter he presents the basis of the social democratic 
welfare project and the strategy of equality. The presentation shows the confidence these 
people had in a belief that public expenditures on the social services could promote social 
equality. Unfortunately, the conclusion to the chapter is rather depressing since, according 
to LeGrande, one can as much identify a ‘Matthew effect’ as a ‘Robin Hood effect’ in the 
wake of decades of social democratic redistributional politics. My focus has not been on 
economic and social equality in itself but rather on the operationalised consequences of 
such inequalities (i. e. what in this chapter is called ‘modern social problems’). My own 
conclusion is no less optimistic than LeGrande’s. 
For those who would argue that these are ex post conclusions I would remind them that the 
historical presentation given above shows that the politicians in charge at a relatively early 
point of time warned about this development, as did the researchers (Leonardsen, 1993, 
Hovedkomiteen, 1976). However, instead of entering an analysis about market forces 
released contra the omnipotence of the welfare state, one took the last premise for granted. 
From my argument above, I think it is fair to conclude that responsible politicians today 
should invite a debate where value conflicts in late modern capitalist societies are given full 
attention. An open discussion on topics like injustices and lack of respect and recognition 
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(Honneth, 1995, Sennett, 2003) for people struggling with being fully competitive in a risk 
society should be an important ingredient in such a discussion.      
2. The structure of problems and their solving strategies. As mentioned above, a prerequisite 
for the welfare principle was that the state had full control over those values and 
interests that were to be safeguarded. However, values like ‘meaning of life’, 
‘happiness’, and ‘social inclusion’ are difficult to implant by way of administrative 
instructions. As Habermas (1976: 71) points out, ‘the structural dissimilarity between 
areas of administrative action and areas of cultural tradition constitutes, then, a 
systematic limit to attempts to compensate for legitimation deficits through conscious 
manipulation’. This is due to the fact that cultural traditions have their own, vulnerable 
conditions of reproduction that are shaped with what Habermas calls ‘hermeneutic 
consciousness’; in other words that ‘there is no administrative production of meaning’ 
(op. cit. 70). What Habermas does here is to draw a principally important distinction 
between two types of rationalities, one referring to the ‘system world’ and one referring 
to ‘the life world’; each having their own idiosyncratic ways of reproduction. In 
practical life, of course, these principles do not (and cannot) operate in separate spheres. 
However, there is a strong case for arguing not only that in late modern society the 
value system of the economic system has invaded the socio-cultural system, but that 
political parties have had too high expectations about manipulating social problems 
away through ingenious interventions. Once the spirit is released from the bottle (once 
the global market forces are set free) it is hard to get it back again (to get political and 
social control of it). Actually, some influential fractions of the Labour Party argued for a 
long time in a way which reflected on these perspectives. An economist like Per Kleppe 
(who also was a Minister in Labour governments all through the 1970s) was (as we have 
seen) aware of the huge challenges Norwegian participation in an open global economy 
would mean for this country. As we have seen, Reiulf Steen was another spokesman for 
such perspectives. However, it was the pragmatic ’right wing’ part of the Labour Party 
that came to dominate and define the political direction to be followed from the mid-
1980s. In spite of endeavours to revitalise local communities and promotion of concepts 
like self-supporting networks, it was the ‘traditionalists’ (i.e. those arguing that rapid 
economic growth was the road to a qualitatively better society) that had the upper hand. 
4. Conclusion 
How should the above arguments be interpreted? Are the everyday endeavors for a better 
society useless unless we start working with the ‘root causes’ of social problems? Of course 
not. What I am saying is that political promises about social prevention and social inclusion 
should be confronted with an analysis of power relations in modern market societies. If 
agreed upon aims are not attained, in spite of financial muscle and a broad basis of scientific 
know-how then there has to be some strong interests, some powerful centres that have 
become too influential. If political rhetoric about ‘soft values’ are to be taken seriously, it 
seems that one has to change some of the political priorities in advance. From a sociological 
point of view, speeding up the pace of change in a world of speedy changes is hardly 
compatible with safeguarding values like social inclusion and participation for everybody. 
The sociology I know about and the sociology I appreciate gives strong support for such a 
conclusion.  
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Furthermore, one should not discount that the social sciences, given these premises, can 
support the political-administrative system with tools that will create balance were imbalance 
already exists. In the above presentation we have seen that, at an early stage, Norwegian 
politicians appealed to the social sciences for being ‘practically useful’ for decision makers at 
all levels of society. To a large extent one could say that the social sciences were turned into a 
troop of ‘rescuing angels’ for the political-administrative system. It would be an exaggeration 
to argue that these sciences have been able to ‘deliver’. Two conclusions could be drawn from 
this observation: one is that the social sciences are still ‘young of age’, but in due time they will 
certainly develop know-how and practical instruments that will help bringing the socio-
cultural system back into balance. Alternatively, the problem is not one of scientific 
immaturity among sociologists, criminologists, psychologists etc. Rather, the problem is that 
these sciences are embarking on types of problems that they have few chances of solving. I 
think the short historical overview of the Norwegian welfare state above gives credence to 
such a conclusion and supports an argument in favour of taking Galbraith, Illich, vonWright 
and Marcuse (see introduction) much more seriously10.         
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